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Summary
A philosopher of education, Jim Garrison, has sug-
gested that John Dewey’s philosophy is a philosophy
of cultural retooling and that Dewey adopted both his
conception of work and the idea of tool as “a middle
term between subject and object” from Hegel. This
interpretation raises the question of what the relation-
ship of the idea of cultural retooling in Dewey’s work
is to his naturalism and to his allegiance to Darwinian
biological functionalism. To deal with this problem,
this paper analyzes how the idea of cultural retooling is
elaborated in Dewey’s logic and in his theory of reflec-
tive thinking and compares it to the concept of retooling
in Vygotsky and activity theory. Dewey does recognize
the significance of tools in human practice and the role
of language in the formation of meaning. However, in
his theory of thinking and problem solving, he primarily
resorts to the biological or ecological language of the
organism–environment, in which the concepts of habit
and situation play a central role. It is argued that this
language does not deal with the functions and relation-
ships of different kinds of tools and artifacts in changes
of activity nor supply satisfactory means of analyzing
the historical, institutionalized and cultural dimensions
of human activity.
Introduction
In his paper Dewey's Philosophy and the 
Experience of Working: Labour, Tool and 
Language, Jim Garrison (1995, 99) suggests
that Dewey’s philosophy of reconstruction is a
philosophy of cultural development or cultural
retooling. He thinks that Dewey’s philosophy
owes much to the everyday experience of
working, where labor and tools are as impor-
tant as language. According to him, Dewey’s
epistemology or logic of experience “bears a
remarkable resemblance to Hegel’s dialectics
of labour, tools and language” and Dewey’s
concept of ends-means dialectics parallels
Hegel’s concept of tool as “a middle term be-
tween subject and object”(1995, 88).
Garrison’s reconstruction is interesting in
at least two senses. First, it differs from most
of the interpretations of Dewey’s naturalism
and from the accounts of how Hegel influ-
enced Dewey’s philosophy. Garrison argues
in the paper against the interpretation made by
Richard Rorty (1982, 1998), who suggests that
Dewey was not consequent enough in his uses
of Hegel. According to Rorty, Dewey remained
in his naturalism stuck with the idea of contin-
uation between lower and higher organisms,
and had not managed to appreciate the spe-
cifically human experience based on the use
of language. In Rorty’s mind, Dewey should
have been Hegelian all along instead of com-
bining his legacy with Darwinian evolutionary
thought. Garrison rejects this critique and in-
terprets Dewey’s philosophy as a philosophy
of cultural development or cultural retooling.
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In this paper, I will deal with these two
interpretations to discuss the problem of the
relationship between biological functionalism
and culture in Dewey’s theory and in the study
of human conduct more generally. The debate
is a good introduction to the question of what
kind of concepts and languages are needed to
make sense of both the embodied and situ-
ated (or ecological), and on the other hand,
the distributed, cultural-historical, semiotic
and institutional nature of human activity and
knowledge.
The second issue raised by Garrison’s
paper is the relationship between Deweyan
pragmatism and cultural-historical activity
theory. Similarities and differences between
the two traditions have recently been discussed
by several authors (Garrison 2001, Glassman
2001, Miettinen 2001, Prawatt 1999). In his
paper published in Mind, Culture and Activity 
(2001), Garrison suggests that activity theory
is, in making a distinction between internal
and external, a dualist approach, and suggests
that Dewey’s concept of transactional func-
tional coordination constitutes an alternative
foundation for a theory of human activity.1 In
my comment I (Miettinen 2001) disagreed. In
my understanding, the concept of mediation
activity implies the idea of a transaction or
reciprocal causal interaction: subjects, means
and object are interactively constituted or co-
 1 In the book collaborated on with Arthur Bentley (1946),
Dewey made a distinction between self-action, interac-
tion and transaction redefined within the concept of
organic interaction (organism-environment interaction)
as transaction. They defined interaction as something
that happens between entities that have a fixed and in-
dependent existence, whereas only transaction is a truly
relational understanding of reality; entities emerge as
a result of their transactions or are functional units
that gain their character from the role they play in the
transaction (Dewey & Bentley 1949/1989, 96-130), for
a short account see Bernstein 1967, 80-86, Garrison
2001, 285-289. The relational materialism of actor net-
work theory with its principle of generalized symmetry
resembles this conception (see Miettinen 1999).
evolved in activity.2 It is, therefore, fruitful to
analyze the two traditions as different but in
many respects complementary, rather than mu-
tually excluding alternative theories of human
activity (Miettinen 2006).
The exclusive focus on the differences
between social ontologies does not stimulate
useful comparisons of nor dialogue between
theoretical traditions. It may lead to what Par-
tric Baert (2005,154) recently called an onto-
logical fallacy, an idea that methodological
questions can be reduced to ontology. Baert
rightly, in my mind, suggests that methodol-
ogy also depends on the aims and objects of
research. It is important for researchers to be
aware of their ontological commitments, but in
addition, problem-specific intermediary con-
cepts and reflection on the unit of analysis as
well as on the methods and data of empirical
research are needed. They cannot be derived
from the ontological commitments alone.3
Several theoretical communalities be-
tween pragmatism and activity theory (and
the Marxist theory of practice behind it) have
been suggested. Both appreciate context over
foundation (Gavin 1988). Both recognize the
primacy of the idea of practical activity and the
changing nature of reality instead of trying to
study fixed permanent essences in the world.
And both are committed to the practical trans-
formation of the world. As to the last point,
William James characterized the pragmatist
method “as an indication of the ways of which
existing realities can be changed” (1907, 45),
and Dewey underlined the importance of clari-
fying the meaning of philosophical concepts
 2 For activity theory a human subject is emerging and
relational (an ensemble of social relationships, as de-
fined by Marx), and an object of activity is always a
transitional object.
 3 This problem can also be formulated by asking how a
transactionist ontology contributes to an experimen-
tal social method (Dewey 1927/1988, 360) or to the
question of practical reformation of social conditions
(ibid, 367).
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as “programs of behavior for modifying the
existent world” (1916/1985, 312). This gave
Russell (1951) reason to compare Dewey’s
concept of action to Marx’s concept of praxis
as defined in the 11th Thesis on Feuerbach in
which Marx states that the task of philosophy
is to change the world. In the Vygotskian and
the activity theoretical traditions, the idea of
advancing individual and social development
by instruction or by developmental interven-
tions has been central.
Besides such general communalities,
there are also differences between these two
theories. Stimulated by Garrison’s paper on
Dewey’s theory of cultural retooling, I will
discuss in this paper two of those differences.
The first is the role of tool and retooling in
Dewey’s theory compared to the concept of
retooling in Vygotsky and activity theory. The
second difference concerns how context is un-
derstood in studying and inducing change in
human activities.
In what follows, I will first outline an ac-
count of Garrison’s debate with Rorty and
his interpretation of Dewey’s philosophy as
a philosophy of cultural retooling. Second,
to discuss the significance of retooling and
the nature of context in Dewey, I will exam-
ine two basic concepts in Dewey’s theory of
inquiry or reflective thought, namely habit
and situation. Dewey’s theory of inquiry is a
theory of problem solving and a theory of the
reconstruction of the environment. It therefore
serves as a case of how tools and environment
are included in Dewey’s concept of inquiry
and action. It will be argued that since these
terms are primarily defined in biological and
ecological terms, neither the historical nature
of context nor the idea of cultural retooling are
very visible in this theory. It will be suggested
that other units of analysis, instead of and in
addition to situation, are needed to make sense
of human thought and activity.
Rorty’s critique of Dewey
and Garrison’s counterargument
suggesting that Dewey’s
philosophy is a philosophy
of cultural retooling
Garrison starts his paper by reconstructing
the critique given in Richard Rorty’s essay on
Dewey’s metaphysics (1982). Rorty resorts in
his essay to the well-known announcement that
Dewey made in 1949. In the new introduction
to his major metaphysical work Experience
and Nature (1925), Dewey said that had he
an opportunity “to write or rewrite the book
today” he would have selected the concept of
culture instead of nature (Dewey 1988, 361).
Rorty (1982) thinks this is what Dewey should
have done but did not do in his philosophy of
experience. Rorty agrees with George Santa-
na’s critique of Dewey’s 'empirical naturalistic
metaphysics' in which Dewey suggests that an
empirical method is needed to transcend sub-
ject-object dualism (Dewey 1925/1988, 19):
“The empirical method is the only method
which can do justice to this inclusive integri-
ty of “experience.” It alone takes this integrat-
ed unity as the starting point for philosophic
thought.” Rorty comments (1982, 81):
… no man can serve both Locke and Hegel. No-
body can claim to offer an empirical account of
something called “the inclusive integrity of experi-
ence", nor take this “integrated unity as a starting
point for philosophic thought,” if he also agrees
with Hegel that the point of philosophic thought
is bound to be the dialectical situation which one
finds oneself caught in in one’s own historical pe-
riod – the problems of men of one’s time.
In a more recent essay Dewey between Hegel 
and Darwin (1998), Rorty says that Dewey
should have been consequent in follow-
ing the Hegelian legacy instead of trying to
“marry Hegel with Darwin.” This idea per-
sisted throughout Dewey’s whole intellectual
career and is visible in his late work Logic, 
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The Theory of Inquiry (1938). Rorty refers
to the Dewey scholars who suggest that for
Dewey the Hegelian legacy meant the unity
or integration of subject and object, and this
unity was redefined in biological or ecological
terms as 'organic unity' referring to the integra-
tion between an organism and its environment
(Hollinger 1986, Bredo 2003)4. The idea of
organic unity also implied the principle of con-
tinuity of experience, an attempt to formulate
a concept of experience that transcends the
boundaries of living species5. According to
Rorty (1998, 297-298):
Dewey should have dropped the term “experience”,
not redefined it. He should have looked elsewhere
for the continuity between us and brutes. He should
have agreed with Peirce with the great gulf between
sensation and cognition, decided that cognition was
possible only for language users, and then said that
the only relevant break in continuity was between
non-language users (amoebas, squirrels, babies)
and language users. (…) So, my alternative Dewey
would have said, we can construe “thinking” as
simply use of sentences–both for purposes of ar-
ranging co-operative enterprises and for attribut-
ing inner states (beliefs, desires) to our fellow
humans.
Garrison does not accept Rorty’s critique at all.
He contends that Dewey’s concept of experi-
ence is not the kind of concept used by Locke,
 4 In his early essay Kant and Philosophic Method
(1884/1969) Dewey dealt with the unity of subject and
object. He stated that “the only conception adequate to
experience as a whole is organism” and said that this
idea can be found in Hegel’s Logic (p. 42-43).
 5 Rorty refers particularly to Hollinger’s analysis (1986,
44), according to which an important 'point of transi-
tion' from idealism to naturalism took place in 1891
when William James’s Principles of Psychology ap-
peared. Dewey contended in 1911 that James’s “biologi-
cal conception of experience” was “perhaps a funda-
mental thing” prompting his reorientation. Hollinger
adds (ibid.), “James’s empirism as Dewey understood
it (…) was compatible with the opposition to atom-
ism and hedonism, and the commitment to the ideal
of organic unity, which Dewey derived from Morris,
Green, and Hegel, and never relinquished throughout
his long career.”
Descartes or Kant. Instead it refers to the trans-
formative practical relationship of an organism
to its environment, the prototype of which in
humans is craftwork. According to Garrison,
Dewey is a philosopher of culture, but does
not restrict culture – as Rorty does – to the
linguistic practices of intellectuals. Instead
(Garrison 1995, 90) “Dewey’s philosophy of
culture is made as much of labour and tools as
it is by what, for Dewey, was tools of the tools,
the language.” He further suggests (ibid.) that
“Dewey’s naturalistic reconstruction of Hegel
restricts itself entirely to the confines of human
purposes, the confines of culture.”
To make the foundations of this concept
of culture understandable, Garrison presents
Hegel’s philosophy of work. He elects to con-
centrate on two early manuscripts of Hegel,
Systems of Ethical Life and First Philosophy 
of Spirit, for two reasons. First, these early pa-
pers have more to say about work than Hegel’s
later works. Secondly, these manuscripts refer
to “the free labour of Greek artisans” and not
to the servile labor distorted by the master-
slave relationship that Hegel analyzed in the
Phenomenology of Sprit. According to Gar-
rison, it is this Greek understanding of the
experience of labor that contributed to the
construction of epistemology and metaphys-
ics in Dewey. In the System of Ethical Life,
Hegel suggests three 'moments ' or levels in
the development of an ethical life:
1) Desire, imaginative awareness of what is
needed,
2) Satisfaction, the possession of an object
of desire, which proceeds to supercede
the separation between subject and object,
and
3) Tool, the permanent possession of the
means of satisfying the need and desire,
a rational synthesis. “On account of this
rationality of the tool it stands as a middle
term, higher than labour, higher than the
object (fashioned for enjoyment), and
Outlines • No. 2 • 2006
7
higher than the enjoyment at the end aimed
at” (Harris & Knox 1979, 122).
Garrison cites also First Philosophy of Spirit
where Hegel further elaborates on the concept
of tool (Harris & Knox, 230-231): “The tool is
the existing rational middle, the existing uni-
versality, of the practical process. It is wherein
laboring has its permanence, that which alone
remains over from the laboring and the product
of work, wherein their contingency is eternal-
ized immortalized; it is propagated in tradi-
tions.” Hegel also says that the rational middle
term is speech, “the tool of reason.”
Garrison then develops the argument that
this concept of tool and language presented by
Hegel is parallel to what Dewey developed in
Experience and Nature. Garrison argues that
in this book Dewey, like Hegel, “believed that
experience arose out of labour and the use of
tools” (p. 100) and that Dewey’s methodologi-
cal behaviorism can be called “a labour theory
of meaning, or more fully, a labour, tools and
language theory of meaning” (p. 102). Accord-
ing to Garrison, Dewey’s concept of experience
concerns how ideal or imaginary objects come
into existence. Dewey’s metaphysics “will turn
out to be no more than what would be found
in any concrete historical situation in which
workers strive to realize their ideas and values”
(Garrison 1995, 95). Craftwork is a model of
such transformative accomplishment.
As Garrison points out, in Chapter 4 of
Experience and Nature, Dewey deals with the
concept of tool. Tools play at least four es-
sential functions in craftwork. 1) They express
the causal relationships in nature (1925/1988,
101): “Tool is a particular thing, but it is more
than a particular thing, since it is a thing in
which a connection, a sequential bond of na-
ture is embodied. (…) A tool denotes a percep-
tion and acknowledgment of sequential bonds
in nature.” 2) It provides the intelligent con-
trolling principle that regulates the connection
of things in activity and as a means to an end,
“a thing used as an agency for some conclud-
ing event” (ibid, 105). Dewey elaborates his
idea of the epistemological significance of tool
use in craftwork as follows (ibid., 73-74):
Labor manifests things in their connections of
things with one another, in efficiency, productiv-
ity, furthering, hindering, generating, destroying.
From the standpoint of enjoyment a thing is what
it directly does for us. From that of labor a thing
is what it will do to other things–the only way in
which a tool or an obstacle can be defined. (…).
Regularity, orderly sequence, in productive labor
presents itself to thought as a controlling principle.
Industrial arts are the type-forms of experience that
bring to light the sequential connections of things
with one another.
Language is a special kind of tool that makes
shared meaning making possible in a human
community. Meaning is “the acquisition of
significance by things in their status in mak-
ing possible and fulfilling shared cooperation”
(ibid., 142). This is achieved using language
(ibid., 145): “As to be a tool, or to be used
as means for consequences, is to have and to
endow with meaning, language, being the tool
of tools, is the cherishing mother of all signifi-
cance. … Other instrumentalities and agencies
can originate and develop only in social groups
made possible by language.” Meaning con-
cerns humans and things in their relationship
in shared life-activity (1925/1988, 145):
The meaning of signs moreover always includes
something common as between persons and an ob-
ject. When we attribute meaning to the speaker as
his intent, we take for granted another person who
is to share in the execution of the intent, and also
something, independent of the persons concerned,
through which the intent is to be realized. Persons
and thing must alike serve as means in a common,
shared consequence. This community of partaking
is meaning.
The meaning also implies generalization
from the particular situation of use. Thus
every meaning is also generic or universal
(ibid., 147). It is something common between
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speaker, hearer and the thing to which speech
refers. A meaning is universal as a means of
generalization. “For a meaning is a method
of action, a way of using things as means to a
shared consummation, and method is general,
though the things to which it is applied are
particular” (ibid., 147).
With meaning made possible by language,
tools achieve two other functions in addition to
revealing causal relationships between things
and functioning as a means of controlling them
for human purposes, i.e., functioning as means
to ends. Tools 3) consolidate meanings, that is,
the means-ends connections objectified in tools
can be used repeatedly. “The invention and use
of tools have played a large part in consolidat-
ing meanings, because a tool is a thing used as
means to consequences, instead of being taken
directly and physically” (Dewey1925/1988,
146). In addition, 4) they can be used to tran-
scend the limits of present and local conditions
(ibid.): “It (a tool) is intrinsically relational,
anticipatory, predictive. Without reference to
the absent, or “transcendence,” nothing is a
tool.”
All these statements by Dewey show that
the core content of Experience and Nature
does not support Rorty’s critique, according
to which Dewey did not fully appreciate the
meaning of language in recognizing the speci-
ficity of human activity. This recognition be-
comes already evident in the introduction – and
in several other passages – in the book, where
Dewey draws a distinction between humans
and animals (1925/1988, 7 and 146):
Ability to respond to meanings and to employ
them, instead of reacting merely to physical con-
tacts, makes the difference between man and other
animals; it is the agency for elevating man into
the realm of what is usually called the ideal and
spiritual. In other words, the social participation
affected by communication, through language and
other tools, is the naturalistic link which does away
with the often alleged necessity of dividing the ob-
jects of experience into two worlds, one physical
and one ideal. (…) The most convincing evidence
that animals do not “think” is found in the fact that
they have no tools, but depend upon their own rela-
tively-fixed bodily structures to effect results.
In this statement Dewey also resumes his
metaphysics, according to which reality has
a practical character, objects gain meaning in
the context of human practices, and the dis-
tinction between ideal and physical objects is
artificial.
Does the theorizing in Experience and 
Nature suffice to support Garrison’s thesis
that Dewey’s philosophy is a philosophy of
cultural retooling, that it is “Hegelian all the
way” (p. 88), and that Hegel’s early philoso-
phy of labor contributed in an important way
to Dewey’s theory of experience? Does it suf-
fice to show that Rorty’s critique of Dewey’s
concept of ‘naturalized’ experience inspired by
Darwin is without foundation? My provisional
answer to these questions is negative.
As to the first question, Garrison does not
present evidence of the impact of Hegel’s early
theory of labor on Experience and Nature. Nei-
ther does he refer to the extensive literature
that analyzes Hegel’s significance to Dewey
nor does he compare his own position to other,
alternative interpretations presented in this lit-
erature (e.g., Bernstein 1971, 167-172, Burke
1994, 18-22 Sleeper 2001, 23-28). His position
differs from the interpretation mostly shared
by this literature, according to which the con-
tribution of Hegel to Dewey was the idea of
organic unity (the integration of subject and
object), the ontology of change and becom-
ing, and the idea that thought transforms cul-
ture and simultaneuosly is based on it. It is also
contrary to the mainstream interpretation that
Dewey turned away from Hegelian idealism
to a naturalism inspired by Darwin and Wil-
liam James. Studies of Logical Theory (1903)
is mentioned often as a turning point in this re-
spect. As Dewey himself recollected, it was the
“the objective biological approach of James-
ian psychology” and “the idea of organism”,
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“thinking of life in terms of life in action” that
gave a new direction and quality to his thinking
(Dewey 1930/1988, 157-159). Richard Bern-
stein’s early suggestion (1967, 46) that Dewey
critically adopted the Greek understanding of
craftsmanship and skills based on custom and
habit in the construction of his theory of expe-
rience seems credible.6 Dewey found the model
for the reconstruction of experience, missing
from the Greek conception, in experimentation
in modern natural science.
It is true that the reading of Experience and 
Nature does not support Rorty’s polemical
suggestion that Dewey did not acknowledge
the qualitative difference between humans
(language users) and animals (non-language
users). However, the concern over whether the
naturalistically interpreted concept of experi-
ence limited Dewey’s attempts to develop a
theory of human thought and action is, in my
mind, justified. In trying to make sense of how
the naturalist conception of experience works
in Dewey’s theory of inquiry, I will compare
it with ideas presented by Vygotsky’s theory
and to cultural-historical activity theory, which
more strongly than Dewey underlines the qual-
itative difference between the biological and
cultural and therefore has developed another
kind of language to make sense of human ac-
tion. This comparison also makes it possible to
remark on the differences in the interpretations
of Hegel’s legacy and his theory of work.
Habit and situation in
Dewey’s logic of experience
The two main technical concepts used by
Dewey in the definition of the logic of inquiry
are habit and situation. These terms, in turn,
are connected to two more metatheoretical con-
 6 Dewey’s strong interest in manual training pedagogy,
which was popular in the late 19th century and central
in his pedagogical thought might have contributed to
his idea of craftwork as a model of experience.
cepts, unity or integration and continuation. In
Logic, the interrelationship between these con-
cepts and Dewey’s phase model of inquiry (or
reflective thought) is well articulated. Dewey
defines the concepts of habit and situation in
Logic primarily in biological and 'ecological'
terms, that is, in terms of the equilibrium of the
organism-environment interaction. Before pre-
senting the pattern or structure of inquiry in the
second part of the book, Dewey first deals with
the two matrixes of inquiry, biological (chapter
2) and cultural (chapter 3). In the analysis of
the cultural matrix, Dewey, like in Experience
and Nature, very clearly articulates the social
origins of specifically human conduct and its
foundations in the use of language. The evo-
lutionary continuity did not mean similarity to
Dewey (1938/1991, 26):
Continuity (…) means that rational operations grow
out of organic activities, without being identical
with that from which they emerge. There is an ad-
justment of means to consequences in the activities
of living creatures, even though not directed by
deliberate purpose.
Instead Dewey says that what the postulate
of continuity does exclude (ibid., 31) “is the
appearance upon the scheme of a totally new
outside force as a cause of changes that occur.”
Accordingly, Dewey thinks that the origins of
reflection are in biological adaptive behavior
and “the ultimate function of its cognitive as-
pects is the prospective control of the condi-
tions of the environment.” He contends that
the function of intelligence is that of “taking
into account in which more effective and more
profitable relations with the objects may be
established in the future” (1931, 3).
Vygotsky postulated more strongly than
Dewey the idea of discontinuity; a qualitative
transition from biological to cultural develop-
ment played a more important role for him
than for Dewey (Vygotsky 1978, 57):
Pragmatism and activity theory: Is Dewey's philosophy … • Reijo Miettinen
10
The internalization of socially rooted and histori-
cally developed activities is the distinguishing fea-
ture of human psychology, the basis of the qualita-
tive leap from animal to human psychology. (…)
The internalization of cultural forms of behavior
involves the reconstruction of psychological activ-
ity on the basis of sign operations.7
Even if there were no fundamental theo-
retical difference between these two interpre-
tations, the difference in emphasis seems to
have led to different vocabularies in the two at-
tempts to explain human activity and thought.
The principle of continuity did lead Dewey to
develop a theory of inquiry – as suggested by
Rorty – that covers all types of organism-en-
vironment relationships in terms of situations
using the language of biology. As a result, as
I will try to show in the following, the means
of analyzing the historicity and specifically
cultural contents of human activity were not
particularly well developed in Dewey’s theory
of inquiry.
Situation is the unit of analysis in the study
of inquiry. The leading European pragmatist in
sociology, Hans Joas, suggests in his Creativity 
of Action (1996) that situation should be the
unit of the analysis of actions instead of the
traditional means-ends connection or the tra-
jectory of action as a realization of a plan. The
analysis of Dewey’s concept of situation may
also be relevant to understanding the thesis of
the situatedness of knowledge that is currently
widely defended in sociology of organizations
and organizational learning. Dewey defines his
basic concept of habit in Logic in terms of a
double modification of the organism-environ-
ment equilibrium (1938/1991, 38):
 7 In Experience and Nature Dewey reflects on the con-
sequences of communication for human experience
(1925/1988, 213): “Human learning and habit-forming
present thereby an integration of organic-environmen-
tal connections so vastly superior to those of animals
without language that its experience appears to be
super-organic.”
In the behavior of higher organisms, the close of the
circuit is not identical with the state out of which
disequilibration and tension emerged. A certain
modification of environment has also occurred,
though it may be only a change in the conditions
which future behavior must meet. On the other
hand, there is change in the organic structures that
conditions further behavior. This modification con-
stitutes what is termed habit. (…) Habits are the
basis of organic learning. According to the theory
of independent successive units of excitation-reac-
tion, habit-formation can mean only the increasing
fixation of certain ways of behavior through rep-
etition, and an attendant weakening of other be-
havioral activities. (…) In habit and learning the
linkage is tightened up not by sheer repetition but
by the institution of effective integrated interaction
of organic-environing energies – the consummatory
close of activities of exploration and search.
To understand Dewey’s concept of situation,
it is useful to trace from which scientific de-
bates and traditions it emerged. The different
elements or dimensions of the concept were
drawn from at least four sources, and at least
four elements or ideas are intermingled in the
concept. They are 1) the doubt or crisis of a
habit as a starting point for reflection, 2) the
idea of the contextual whole (unity, integra-
tion) as a unit of analysis between atomism
and universalism, 3) situation as immediately
sensed experienced world and 4) the idea that
a problematic situation is objective, non-cogni-
tive and existential by its nature being derived
from the crisis of ongoing activity.
Ad 1). Dewey adopted the idea from Peirce
that Cartesian doubt is not the starting point
of knowledge formation. Instead, it is a crisis
of prevailing beliefs that causes an inquiry.
Dewey adapted this and redefined it in natu-
ralistic terms, stating that the crisis of a habit
presumes reflection and inquiry. Therefore,
as Tom Burke (1994) suggests, situation in
Dewey’s logic must be understood as an in-
stance of the disequilibrium of the organism-
environment interaction or a break down of a
habit (Burke 1994, 22-23):
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Situations, occurring in the ongoing activities of
some given organism/environment system, are in-
stances or episodes (or “fields") of disequilibrium,
instability, imbalance, disintegration, disturbance,
dysfunction, breakdown, etc. (…) Such ongoing
activities just are interactions which constitute in
some manner of organism/environment integra-
tion. Situations, then, occur as instances or epi-
sodes of breakdown or imbalance in this dynamic
integration.
Ad 2). The idea of the unity of integration as
well as a strong anti-atomism is a recurrent
theme in Dewey’s work. As mentioned before,
this was based on the Hegelianism of Dewey’s
early career. The critique of the atomist con-
ceptions of British empirism (the association
of separate ideas) and of psychology (the S-R
connection and reflex arc) was a key intellec-
tual enterprise in Dewey’s theoretical work.
Consequently, in Logic, Dewey starts from
what situation is not and ends up formulating
the idea of the contextual whole (1938/1991,
72):
I begin the discussion by introducing and explain-
ing the denotative force of the word situation. Its
import may perhaps be most readily indicated by
means of a preliminary negative statement. What
is designated by the word “situation” is not a single
object or event or set of objects and events. For we
never experience nor form judgments about objects
and events in isolation, but only in connection with
a contextual whole. This latter is what is called a
“situation.”
Ad 3). One of the critiques that Bertrand Rus-
sell presented of Dewey’s logic concerned the
limits of the concept of situation. Since Dewey
defined the concept as something where things
interact and influence each other, Russell won-
dered whether the whole universe should be
included in a situation (1951). This whitty
remark raises a question of the criteria of
defining the context and the limits of situa-
tion (holistic transactional unity, contextual
whole) as a unit of analysis of human activity.
Dewey’s solution was to draw the limits of
situation (organism-environment interactive
unity) at the immediately experienced world,
which includes those objects and aspects of
environment that are relevant or vital for an
organism (1938/1991, 73):
In actual experience, there is never any such iso-
lated singular object or event; an object or event
is always a special part, phase, or aspect, of an en-
vironing experienced world – a situation. (…) Re-
curring to the main topic, it is to be remarked that
a situation is a whole in virtue of its immediately 
pervasive quality. When we describe it from the
psychological side, we have to say that the situation
as a qualitative whole is sensed or felt.
These formulations have an affinity with the
phenomenological conception of experience.
In his answer to Russell, Dewey repeats that
the nature of situation as a unit of analysis
between atomism and universalism is based
on taking the 'empirically' definable interaction
between an organism and its environment as a
starting point (Dewey 1939, 29):
In other words, the theory of experiential situa-
tions which follows directly from the biological-
anthropological approach is by its very nature a via
media between extreme atomistic pluralism and
block universe monisms. Which is but to say that it
is genuinely empirical in a naturalistic sense.
Ad 4). Finally, Dewey underlines the ‘natu-
ral,’ practical and vital needs that are behind
the organism-environment disequilibrium
(1938/1991, 111):
The indeterminate situation comes into existence
from existential causes, just as does, say, the or-
ganic imbalance of hunger. There is nothing intel-
lectual or cognitive in the existence of such situ-
ations, although they are the necessary condition
of cognitive operations or inquiry. In themselves
they are precognitive. The first result of evocation
of inquiry is that the situation is taken, adjudged,
to be problematic. To see that a situation requires
inquiry is the initial step in inquiry.
Although each of the four elements of situa-
tion have partly different origins in scientific
debates, they are complementary and are de-
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fined by each other’s terms. Doubt or crisis
arises because the equilibrium of the organ-
ism-environment relationship (or functional
coordination) is threatened. The contextual
whole elaborated against atomism is defined
using the concept of immediate experience,
which again is interpreted in terms of the or-
ganism-environment relationship. The ‘natu-
ralistic’ or ecological organism-environment
language allows the unification of these ele-
ments into one frame. In the following section
I will study how the concepts of habit and situ-
ation elaborated using the language of biol-
ogy also constitute a central basis for Dewey’s
logic and theory of thought. In addition, an
ideal of the experiment in natural sciences is
used to make sense of the transformation of a
situation. It will argued, that as a result of this
combination, paradoxically, tools do not play
any significant role in his theory of logic.
Inquiry, continuity and learning:
where are the artifacts?
Dewey’s definition of inquiry in Logic
(1938/1991, 108-109) is based on the concept
of situation: “Inquiry is the controlled or direct-
ed transformation of an indeterminate situation
into one that is so determinate in its constitu-
ent distinctions and relations as to convert the
elements of the original situation into a unified
whole”8. Dewey presents the five phases (or es-
sential functions, aspects) of reflective thought
or inquiry in How We Think (1933/1989) and
in Logic. In the following, I will present the
 8 Dewey further defines the terms he uses (1938/1991,
109): “The original indeterminate situation is not only
‘open’ to inquiry, but it is open in the sense that its
constituents do not hang together. The determinate
situation on the other hand, qua outcome of inquiry, is
a closed and, as it were, finished situation or ‘universe
of experience.’ ‘Controlled or directed’ in the above
formula refers to the fact that inquiry is competent in
any given case in the degree in which the operations
involved in it actually do terminate in the establishment
of an objectively unified existential situation.”
designations for the phases used by Dewey in
How We Think (pp. 201-206). The correspond-
ing, slightly different titles used in Logic will
be presented in parenthesis.
1) Suggestion (The Antecedent Conditions 
of Inquiry: The Indeterminate Situation).
A disturbed, perplex situation temporar-
ily arrests direct activity. Dewey says that
a variety of names serve to characterize
indeterminate situations. These include dis-
turbed, troubled, ambiguous, confused, full
of conflicting tendencies, obscure, etc. “It
is the situation that has these traits. We are
doubtful because the situation is inherently
doubtful” (1938/1991, 110).
2) Intellectualization (Institution of a 
Problem). The indeterminate situation be-
comes problematic in the very process of
being subjected to inquiry. To see that a
situation requires inquiry is the initial step
of inquiry.
3) The guiding idea, hypothesis (The
Determination of a Problem-Solution).
A possible relevant solution is suggested
by the determination of factual conditions
which are secured by observation. Ideas
are anticipated consequences (forecasts)
of what will happen when certain opera-
tions are executed under and with respect
to observed conditions.
4) Reasoning (in the narrower sense)
(Reasoning). This process is composed of
developing the meaning-contents of ideas
in their relations to other ideas.
5) Testing the hypothesis by action
(The Operational Character of 
Facts-Meanings).
Dewey explains the relationship of reasoning
and experimental actions in Logic as follows
(1938/1991, 121):
The pre-cognitive unsettled situation can be settled
only by modification of its constituents. Experi-
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mental operations change existing conditions. Rea-
soning, as such, can provide means for effecting the
change of conditions but by itself cannot effect it.
Only execution of existential operations directed by
an idea in which ratiocination terminates can bring
about the re-ordering of environing conditions re-
quired to produce a settled and unified situation.
In characterizing the phases of reflective
thought, Dewey mainly uses two sets of terms.
First he speaks about the constituents of situa-
tion, which are analyzed in order to formulate
an idea or a working hypothesis. The observa-
tion of constituents, directed by hypothesis,
produces facts. These contribute to the redefi-
nition of the idea (working hypothesis), which
is formulated using symbols.
In Dewey’s treatment of the inquiry of
a problematic situation, the ideal of experi-
mental natural science is visible. The work-
ing hypothesis directs the observation of the
constituents of the situation, which leads to
facts that contribute to the respecification of
the working hypothesis. Following the model
of the method of experimental natural science,
Dewey regards observation and data on one
hand, and inference and suggestion (idea) on
the other, as key elements in reflective think-
ing (1933/1989, 198). It is conspicuous that
the concept of tool is not used at all9. This
is even more astonishing since Dewey used
the natural-scientific experiment as a model in
constructing his logic. As shown recently by
the sociology of experimentation, instruments
constitute a vital part of any experimental ac-
tivity (Pickering 1995, Rheinberger 1997). In
Dewey’s logic, the idea or working hypothesis
is the only means explicitly discussed. Tools
and other means remain constituents of the
situation and have no special methodologi-
 9 Only once does Dewey mention in the description of
the phases of the inquiry that operations involve “tech-
niques and organs of observation” (1938/1991, 121).
He says nothing about the techniques or tools of the
practical transformation of objects.
cal position in the analysis. Although Dewey
underlines the operative nature of both ideas
and facts, it remains unclear how a working
hypothesis is transformed into the “existential
operations” needed for the reconstruction of
the situation. Can these operations of practi-
cal transformation be made without the use of
relevant tools?
Dewey’s theory of inquiry does not deal
with how a future-oriented working hypoth-
esis is ‘turned’ into tools and rules that make
the practical transformation of a situation pos-
sible. To solve this problem by referring to
the operative nature of ideas and facts, in my
understanding, is not sufficient. Activity theory
suggests that it is essential to analyze the rela-
tionship between signs and tools, that is, the
relationship and interconnection between the
different types of mediational means that are
necessary for the practical transformation of
any historically constituted situation.
Dewey deals with the wider significance
of ‘situated reflection’ in terms of continuity.
What has been experienced before in previous
situations is used (and possibly transformed)
in novel situations. From the point of view of
the individual, this transformation of experi-
ence constitutes a process of “growing” and
learning. The question of what the ‘carrier’ is
of such a temporal continuity in experience
remains. According to Dewey, habits, or ways
of doing things enriched by intelligence, are
the carriers of the results of the previous ex-
perience. It, however, remains unclear what
constitutes the foundation of the continuity
of habits. In some instances, Dewey seems to
think that habits are first of all embodied pre-
dispositions to ways of responding ingrained
in the nervous and muscular system of an or-
ganism (1938/1991, 146):
I see or note directly that this is a typewriter, that
is a book, the other thing is a radiator, etc. This
kind of direct “knowledge” I shall call apprehen-
sion; it is seizing or grasping, intellectually, without
questioning. But it is a product, mediated through
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certain organic mechanisms of retention and habit,
and it presupposes prior experiences and mediated
conclusions drawn from them10.
Dewey does say that thinking includes not
only the use of biological organs like eyes,
hands and brains but also “apparatus and appli-
ances of all kinds” (Dewey 1916/1985, 328)11.
In Logic, the idea presented in Experience and 
Nature, according to which tools and artifacts
may function as carriers of prior experience, is
not taken any further. Theoretically, the parts
or constituents of environment, the affordances
and potentialities of its objects, including
tools, belong to habits. In Logic, as well as in
many of its interpretations, however, the role
of mediational artifacts in the transformation
of situations is not elaborated.
Many of the modern interpretations of
Dewey underline the embodied nature of hab-
its (Joas 1996, Manicas 2002). Hans Joas, for
example, uses the concept of body schema by
Merleau-Ponty to make the formation of hab-
its understandable. Tom Burke assumes the
position according to which accumulation of
experience and knowledge takes place without
 10 On the other hand, in the Public and its Problems,
Dewey characterizes the social origins and meaning
of habit as follows (1927/1988, 334-335): “Habit is the
mainspring of human action, and habits are formed for
the most part under the influence of the customs of a
group. (…) The influence of habit is decisive because
all distinctively human action has to be learned, and the
very heart, blood and sinews of learning is creation of
habitudes. (…) The sailor, miner, fisherman and farmer
think, but their thoughts fall within the framework of
accustomed occupations and relationships. We dream
beyond the limits of use and wont, but only rarely does
revery become a source of acts which break bounds...”
This double definition of habit as an individual ‘organ-
ic’ disposition and as a reproduction of a custom of a
group resembles Bordieu’s (1977) concept of habitus.
 11 “Since these physical operations (including the cerebral
events) and equipments are a part of thinking, think-
ing is mental, not because of a peculiar stuff which
enters into it or of peculiar non-natural activities which
constitute it, but because of what physical acts and
appliances do: the distinctive purpose for which they
are employed and the distinctive results which they
accomplish (Dewey 1916/1985, 328).”
the objectification of the results of activity in
cultural artifacts (1994, 256):
Particular knowings as inquiries, i.e. specific in-
stances of the applications of one’s dispositions,
aptitudes, and habits to solving given problems, are
distinguished here from knowledge, constituting
stable outcomes of specific inquiries (in the form
of judgement), both of which is distinguished from
intelligence, which is the result of the development
and accumulation (learning, habituation, standard-
ization, routinization) of capabilities to act (inquire)
in specific ways.
Dewey interestingly speculates about the po-
tential of the “by-product” of inquiry, an ob-
jectified meaning (1916/1985, 22-23): “And it
may well be that this by-product, this gift of
the gods, is incomparably more valuable for
living a life than is the primary and intended
result of control, essential as that control to
having a life to live.” This position, the objec-
tification of a hypothesis or a meaning into a
shared cultural artifact, is, however, not devel-
oped in Logic. It is the language of the biologi-
cal matrix that dominates the characterization
of the inquiry in the book.
I think we face here a difference between
pragmatism and activity theory and what they
draw from the Hegelian legacy. For Dewey’s
pragmatism it is the idea of organic unity, and
for activity theory it is objectification of the
activity into cultural artifacts, signs and tools.
Ilyenkov resumes the latter position by say-
ing (1977, 277): “All forms of activity (active
faculties) are passed on only in the form of
objects created by man for man.” This tradi-
tion has developed the Hegelian idea of the
objectification of activity into cultural artifacts.
A.N Lektorsky (1980, 137) points out, “The
instrumental man-made objects function as ob-
jective forms of expression of cognitive norms,
standards and object-hypotheses existing out-
side the individual.” Marx expressed the sig-
nificance of cultural artifacts in The Economic 
& Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 as follows
(1964, 142): “The history of industry and the
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established objective existence of industry
are the open book of man’s essential powers.
(…) A psychology for which this … remains
a closed book, cannot become a genuine,
comprehensive and real science.” If we think
about the significance of the breakthrough of
information technology and the internet for
the organization of creative work and the ca-
pabilities of individuals, the relevance of this
argument becomes evident.
Vygotsky made the distinction between
two kinds of means, tool and sign, that orient
human behavior differently (1979, 55). The
function of tools is to serve as a conductor of
human influence on the object of activity. Sign
is used as a ‘psychological tool,’ as a means
of internal activity aimed at mastering oneself.
In his study on the functions of artifacts in
human activity, Wartofsky (1979, 202) made
a distinction between primary artifacts (tools),
and secondary and tertiary artifacts. A tool is
a primary artifact. Secondary artifacts, in turn,
are about the conditions, ways and patterns of
using tools (in ecological terms, about forms
of interaction of the organism and its envi-
ronment). They become objectified into “ex-
ternally embodied representations” of actions
such as models. The difference between medi-
ating artifacts is related to the social origins of
human activity and language. Signs or second-
ary artifacts originate “as instruments for co-
operative, communicative and self-conscious
shaping and controlling of the procedures of
using and making technical tools (Engeström
1987, 61).
The distinction between functional types
of artifacts is related to the hierachical struc-
ture of human activity. In an individual, learn-
ing is embodied in the body’s ways of using
tools and signs, that is, operations. However,
the important problems of human activities
are collective and highly shared and call for
the transformation of secondary and tertiary
artifacts that function as means of reflection
and orientation to the future in activity. The
conjoint reworking of the latter seems to be
vital in a change of activity12. The ecological
language based on the organism-environment
relationship tends to remain on an individual
level and does not supply means for analyz-
ing the transformation of collective human
activities.
Concluding discussion
Can Dewey’s philosophy be characterized as
a philosophy of cultural retooling? I would be
hesitant to do so. Dewey recognized the signifi-
cance of tools in human practice and the role
of language in the formation of meanings. The
idea of means for consequences was so central
in his instrumentalism that his philosophy has
been characterized as a philosophy of technol-
ogy (Hickman 1990). The term cultural retool-
ing would not, however, do justice to the per-
manent naturalistic ideal in his work inspired
by biological psychology and evolutionary the-
ory (see e.g., Dalton 2002). I analyzed in this
paper one expression of this ideal, the use of
biological and ecological language in Dewey’s
theory of inquiry and reflective thought.
It seems to me that the cultural interpreta-
tion of Dewey’s philosophy allows the signs of
the turn to culture in the late Dewey to char-
acterize the whole of his philosophy. Dewey
hoped to be able to write the book on Culture 
and Nature (Sleeper 2001, 106). In a letter
written to Arthur Bentley in 1951, Dewey
characterized how he intended to continue
his philosophical project (cited by Sleeper
2001, 16):
If I ever get the needed strength, I want to write on
knowing as the way of behaving in which linguistic
artifacts transact business with physical artifacts,
tools, implements, apparatus, both kind of being
 12 For the significance of different artifacts in the develop-
ment of work, see Engeström 1992, Engeström & al.
2005 and Miettinen & Virkkunen 2005.
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planned for the purpose and rendering inquiry of
necessity an experimental transaction.
The study of the semiotic mediation of the use
of tools was the starting point for Vygotsky’s
theory 30 years before (1978, 24):
The practical intelligence and sign use can oper-
ate independently of each other in young children,
the dialectical unity of these systems in the human
adult is the very essence of complex human be-
havior. Our analysis accords symbolic activity a
specific organizing function that penetrates the
process of tool use and produces fundamentally
new forms of behavior.
Once the discussion of the affinities between
the Vygotskyan tradition and Deweyan prag-
matism started, the two have been interpreted
using the language of the other. It is well
known that the concept of retooling (or reme-
diation) is central to the Vygotskian tradition.
Eric Bredo, for example, has recently charac-
terized the Deweyan conception of learning as
“learning to use cultural tools in situationally
appropriate ways” (Bredo 2003, 100). Bredo
further describes Dewey’s ideas of teaching
and says (ibid., 104): “Today we might say
that the teacher should set up a properly scaf-
folded ‘zone of proximal development’.” This
is an example of a reinterpretation of Dewey in
terms of the Vygotskian tradition. It is possible
that the interpretation of Dewey’s philosophy
as a philosophy of cultural retooling may be
influenced by this debate.
Another issue that in my mind needs to be
further discussed is the definition of “situa-
tion” as a unit of analysis for human activ-
ity in terms of the organism-environment
relationship. In my understanding, it does not
stimulate the analysis of the historical, distrib-
uted and institutional nature of human activi-
ties. The interpreters of Dewey have character-
ized “situation” (holistic context, integrated
unity) in systemic terms. Burke (1994, 29),
for example, defines it as a “localized instance
of disequilibrium of an organism/environment
system.” However, the criteria of defining the
limits of such a system as well as its structure
remain unclear. As a result, it is also hard to
analyze and interpret a “disequilibrium” of
the system and the nature of the problems or
contradictions it faces13.
In Logic, Dewey characterized the concept
of situation using the principle of immediacy
which depicts reality in terms of the individual
organism or body in its immediate environ-
ment. The principle of continuation comple-
ments immediacy: the experiences of prior situ-
ations effect the present situation and the ways
in which it is transformed. Luria and Vygotsky
(1992, 36) maintained that human behavior is
governed “not by the laws of biology but the
laws of the historical development of society.”
This implies that any situation must be located
historically and can be understood as a part
of the development of society including its
contradictions. The biological conception of
equilibrium does not help in achieving such a
historical contextualization. Edwin Hutchins
(1995, 372) suggested in his ground-breaking
study Cognition in the Wild that any moment in
human practice (event or situation) needs to be
also understood and analyzed as part of several
developmental sequences of activity, each hav-
ing a different rate of change. Hutchins defines
three of them: acts of navigation, development
of the practitioners, and development of navi-
gation work (ibid.), “crystallized in the mate-
rial and conceptual tools of the trade and in the
social organization of work.” The analysis of
these (and other) multiple simultaneous histo-
ries supplies a vital perspective in defining and
understanding the nature of situated problems
and for finding means of solving them.
At least two attempts have been suggested
to specify a social context and find a workable
unit of analysis for the study of human prac-
 13 For a comparison of the accounts of disequilibrium or
contradictions as a dynamic source of transformation
of activity in pragmatism, phenomenology and activity
theory, see Korchman et. al. 1998.
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tices. Both of them take the concepts of object
and objectification, collective nature, and the
historicity of human activity as starting points.
The first is the concept of an activity system
(Leontjev 1978), a historically formed, cultur-
ally and socially mediated system of people
and things, typically a local work community
in an institutional setting (Engeström 1987).
The contradictions of the capitalist society
are expressed in every local activity system,
manifesting themselves in the recurrent distur-
bances and problems to be solved. Problems of
activity are, in this view, not only situationally
specific but instances and expressions of ongo-
ing historical transformations of the capitalist
society.
Another complementary unit of analysis
proposed by science and technology studies,
and actor network theory specifically, is a tra-
jectory of object construction or the creation
of a cultural artifact, be it a scientific fact or a
model, a piece of technology or a new product
or service (Latour 1993, Daston 2000). In such
a construction process – as in the development
of an activity system – the cumulative, shared
and historical nature of activity becomes evi-
dent. The already created individual and col-
lective capabilities and resources are mobi-
lized and used. The reciprocal development of
individuals and their capabilities, the forms of
the collaboration, the means and objects, can
be made visible in such a process of creation.
These units also imply that an activity is com-
posed of hundreds of problem-solving situa-
tions that are related to the various aspects of
the object to be constructed. Both of the units
call for the analysis of multiple histories that
are intertwined in an event or problematic situ-
ation and of the evolving contradictions of the
commodity production in the capitalist market
economy in which we live and into which the
situations are embedded.
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